Many—maybe even most—business teams are dysfunctional. Whether your teammates are co-founders of a startup or the C-suite of a Fortune 500 company, the evidence suggests you are probably not working together as productively as you might. Outsized egos and mis-sized groups are the most frequently cited cause of team dysfunction, but they aren’t the only problem.
A blog post by a self-styled financial veteran knocked the wind out of the Chinese business community recently. The author, Wu Xiaoping, argued that the country’s private firms should step aside and allow the state to increase its dominance of the economy. The private sector has “fulfilled its task of assisting the state-owned economy in achieving its rapid development,” Wu wrote. The article went viral on social media, sparking criticism from entrepreneurs and support from left-wing commenters. Under normal circumstances, a blog by an obscure middle manager would never garner so much attention. But Wu’s post touched a nerve. These are tough times for private firms.
You may not recognize the name SenseTime. But if you have spent time in China recently, SenseTime will almost certainly recognize you. Founded just five years ago by a group of data researchers at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, the startup has rapidly established itself as China’s leading provider of facial recognition technology. Its face-scanning software is used everywhere from smartphones to office blocks and police stations.
Business has always been a team sport, but over the past two decades, teams have become a much more central concern for managers. Pushed by the automation of repetitive tasks and pulled by the need to innovate, many senior executives now believe that their future depends largely on the performance of their teams. But although technology is advancing, people are not. A recent survey among MBA students and degree holders shows that only 29% said that their teams were organized in a way that gave them a three-quarter shot at success.
A new year is a time for fresh starts and new beginnings. At least, that is what policymakers in Beijing will be hoping. The second half of 2018 produced some negative headlines on the economy as a domestic deleveraging drive and the intensifying trade war with the US slowed growth and undermined confidence. Will these headwinds continue battering the Chinese economy or will Beijing be able to engineer a recovery? There are few people better placed to answer this question than Shen Jianguang, one of China’s most respected economic analysts, whose career has included stints at the European Central Bank, IMF and OECD.
On a remote farm nestled deep within the mountainous region of Daozhen, in China’s southwestern Guizhou Province, thousands of chickens are being watched closely. Aided by surveillance cameras and distance-tracking ankle tags, every step, meal and sip that the chickens take inside their paddock is uploaded in real time to an online platform. This farm, along with hundreds like it across China, is part a program that gives consumers a direct data trail from egg to plate. Launched by the technology arm of online insurer ZhongAn in 2017, it aims to boost transparency in China’s food supply chain. The technology behind GoGo Chicken is blockchain.
The rapid deterioration in relations between China and the US over the past 12 months has left many scratching their heads and wondering how we got here. Stephen S. Roach is not one of those people. A former Chief Economist of Morgan Stanley and currently Senior Fellow at Yale University’s Jackson Institute for Global Affairs, Roach has been watching the development of Chinese-US relations closely for more than three decades. For him, a tariff war between the world’s two largest economies was as predictable as it is harmful.
The Sino-US trade tussle has had the greatest impact on multinational corporations in China—precisely the group that the US started out trying to support. Many have begun considering radical courses of action to stay in business.
After years of enjoying the fruits of a booming economy and sharply rising disposable income, life for many of China’s higher earners is getting harder. Amid mounting debt levels and economic headwinds, urban middle-class consumers have responded by scaling back their discretionary spending and reducing luxury purchases—an emerging phenomenon known as the “consumption downgrade.” The newfound frugality of middle-class spenders may be good for their wallets, but it is an unwelcome development for Beijing.
For many in Beijing, the trade war confirms long-held suspicions that the United States is determined to thwart China’s rise as the world’s next superpower. As a result, US demands that China abandon Made in China 2025 have also tended to be viewed by Beijing as being motivated not by concerns over fair competition, but by a desire to make sure America keeps its lead in the global innovation race. Public statements from senior figures in the Trump administration have fueled these concerns—the trade war not as an isolated incident, but part of a longer history of US attempts to undermine rival powers.